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Abstract
While it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms, few 
studies have offered systematic evidence of such activities, and the dynamics of bribery 
in Asian firms have not been well understood. The research reported here used World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES) data to examine some distinct characteristics of 
bribery in Asian firms and to empirically test ten hypotheses on determinants of bribery. 
We find that firm characteristics such as firm size, growth rate and corporate governance 
are important determinants of bribery activities at the firm level, and that Asian firms are 
more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, corrupted court systems, 
convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation of laws and regulations, 
inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes. 
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Introduction
Many Asian countries have experienced phenomenal economic growth in recent 
years. In East Asia, the nine developing economies as a group—China, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand—have 
grown on average about 8% annually since the 1960s (Lau and Park, 2003). South Asia’s 
growth has also been impressive in recent years: almost all South Asian countries except 
Nepal and Sri Lanka experienced an annual economic growth rate of greater than 5% 
during the five years from 2001 to 2005 (Devarajan and Nabi, 2006). The rapid economic 
growth in Asia has enabled many countries to drastically reduce poverty and to 
substantially improve the quality of life for their people (Chen and Wang, 2001; 
Bourguignon, 2003; Ravallion, 2004)
Although growth prospects remain strong in the near future, there is little 
disagreement among experts and policymakers that many Asian countries face mounting 
difficulties in sustaining such growth in the long run. Among the most pressing 
challenges are weaknesses in governance. According to the Corruption Perception Index  
by Transparency International (Table 1), many Asian countries have been consistently 
rated as having high levels of corruption for the most current decade and some of them 
(Myanmar and Bangladesh, for example) are perceived as among the most corrupt 
countries in the world. The persistence and prevalence of corruption pose serious threats 
to Asia’s growth potential, as corruption reduces investment flows and retards the 
development of financial, economic, and political institutions (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000; 
Habib and Zurawicki, 2002).
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Corruption increases the costs of doing businesses in two ways. First, payment of 
bribes increases the costs of providing goods and services. Second, corruption increases 
financial costs because it increases the risk premium. It is estimated that corruption adds 
5% to the costs of doing business in Asia (Kaar, 1995). However, it is grossly inaccurate 
to regard firms merely as passive onlookers or victims of corruptive practices.  In 
environments with high levels of corruption, firms may indeed have no choice but to pay 
“facilitation fees” for government services they are in fact entitled to, but many corrupt 
exchanges are initiated by firms themselves, to avoid or reduce taxes, to secure public 
procurement contracts, to bypass laws and regulations, or to block the entry of potential 
competitors into desirable markets or consortia (Powpaka, 2002; Rose-Ackerman, 2002). 
Firms are the perpetrators in these latter cases, and their willingness to engage in bribery 
activities directly contributes to prevalent corruption problems in Asia. 
Although it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms (Lee 
and Oh, 2007), few studies have offered systematic evidence of bribery activities in firms 
both within and across different Asian countries. Most existing studies focus on the 
demand side of the corruption, that is, on the corrupt government officials who receive 
bribes, while the role of the corporate sector in providing the payoffs is largely ignored. 
As a result, many critical questions regarding the extent and nature of bribery activities 
among Asian firms remain unanswered. For instance, to what extent do these firms 
engage in bribery? What amount of bribes do they pay? Why are there considerable 
differences in bribery as practiced in different Asian countries? Why are some firms more 
prone to bribery than others within individual countries? What are key factors shaping 
firms’ decision to bribe? 
The answers to these questions are not only of paramount importance to 
sustaining growth in Asian countries. They are also essential to the global campaign 
against corruption. The phenomenal growth in Asian economies has enabled some Asian 
countries to become leading exporting nations worldwide, but this economic success 
might pose potential dangers to the global economy if bribery practices localized to Asian 
countries become exported to other countries along with goods and services. 
Transparency International’s Bribe Payers Index shows that Asian firms are among the 
most likely to bribe in emerging markets, and that this is true even for countries or 
economies with relatively low levels of corruption, such as Hong Kong and South Korea. 
The main objective of the present study was to investigate the dynamics of 
bribery in Asian firms by using a unique cross-country firm-level data set from the World 
Business Environment Survey to examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in those 
firms, and to empirically test hypotheses on determinants of bribery. The presentation 
below proceeds with a review of literature on the determinants of bribery, then proposes a 
set of testable hypotheses that are approached by multivariate analysis of the data set. The 
results of that analysis include policy implications that are addressed in the concluding 
discussion.
Determinants of Bribery: Theories and Hypotheses
Scholarly attention to the determinants of corruption has surged during the last 
decade owing to widespread corruption across the globe and also to the increasing 
availability of information on cross-country measures of corruption. Studies have shown 
that Gross Domestic Product (GDP), openness of economy, and quality of political 
institutions, as well as legal and cultural roots, are among the main determinants of 
corruption (Treisman, 2002; Sanyal, 2005). This literature on the determinants of 
corruption has greatly enhanced our understanding of the causes of corruption, but 
analyses based on country-level data can provide only limited insights on the dynamics of 
bribery at the firm level. For example, firms operating in the same country may vary 
greatly in their propensity to pay bribes not only because of different factors specific to 
individual firms, but also because of different perceptions of the external environment. 
One of the main challenges to study bribery at the firm level is the difficulty to measure 
bribery activities systematically. 
In recent years, rigorous analyses on bribery at the firm level have become viable
with the development of appropriate survey techniques. Using a private sector survey 
conducted by the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank, Gaviria (2002)
finds that bureaucratic interference is higher in firms that are more likely to pay bribes,
defying a conventional wisdom that bribes can increase efficiency by allowing firms to 
circumvent bureaucratic harassment. Clark and Xu (2004) show that firms are more 
likely to pay bribes when they are more profitable based on their analysis of firm-level 
data on bribes paid to utilities in 21 transition economics in eastern Europe and central 
Asia, a finding consistent with  Svensson’s (2003) study based on a survey of Uganda 
firms. Herrera and Rodriguez (2003) provide empirical evidences to the claim that firms 
are more likely to pay bribes in environments where firms know in advance the size of 
bribes ad believe that service for which the bribe is offered will be delivered once bribe 
payment is made. 
The present study seeks to contribute to the empirical literature on bribery by 
proposing a comprehensive framework in which various hypotheses with regard to 
determinants of bribery can be jointly tested. We group main potential determinants of 
bribery into three broad categories, they are, namely, firm characteristics, firm’s 
operating environment, and governance influence, and Table 2 lists 10 hypotheses on the 
determinants of bribery under these categories. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Firm Size and Growth Rate
Two easily measured characteristics that might affect firms’ involvement in 
bribery are size and growth. There are strong reasons to believe that small firms may 
have a higher propensity to bribe than large firms. First, small firms may be easy targets 
because they lack power to resist predatory officials’ demands for bribe payments and 
they do not ordinarily attract much attention from government disciplinary agencies and 
law enforcement authorities (Svenson  2003; Herrera and Rodriguez  2003). Second, 
unlike large firms, which often have robust internal procedures for dealing with various 
business frauds, including bribery, small firms are less likely to have such internal 
protocols in place (Arvis and Berenbeim, 2003). Third, small firms may pay a higher 
proportion of their revenues in bribe payments than large firms do. The equilibrium bribe 
rate is often uniform across all firms regardless of size. The result is that small firms may 
appear to have a higher propensity to bribe than large firms, not because they are more 
corrupt but simply in order to keep up with basic requirements in their business 
environment.
Firms that are growing rapidly may be more vulnerable to extortion by corrupt 
officials because of their increasing “ability to pay.” According to the “endogenous 
harassment” theory (Myrdal, 1968), predatory officials can sort targeted firms according 
to their “ability to pay” and demand corresponding levels of bribe payments. This 
possibility has been confirmed by several recent studies. For example, Svensson’s (2003) 
research on firms in Uganda shows that the higher a firm’s current and future profits, the 
more it must pay; Clarke and Xu (2004) report similar findings on the relationship 
between firm performance and bribery from transition economies in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia.
Corporate Governance
Although on the surface bribery may appear to be a low-cost, high-return activity, 
it carries significant risks for firms that practice it, and it is counterproductive in the long 
run (Wu, 2005a). Modern corporations are often subject to principle-agent problems and 
information asymmetry that make it difficult to detect bribery. Principles of good 
corporate governance, such as responsibility, accountability, and transparency, not only 
can improve firms’ operating performance but can also reduce the level of bribery by 
solving principle-agent problems and information asymmetry. Good corporate 
governance also imposes more constraints on corrupt officials by increasing the risks of 
being caught in illicit activities. 
That the majority of businesses in Asia are family-run may contribute to the 
complexity of dealing with bribery practices. Family-run firms are often more vulnerable 
to bribery pressures because they may be perceived by corrupt officials as ideal “trading” 
partners. Family firms are more likely to return past favors because of a longer continuity 
of management (Wu, 2005b). Being involved with a few families instead of a large 
number of firms also could reduce the chances of being exposed, as corrupt officials 
would only need to deal with a few individuals. 
Poor accounting practices in many Asian firms pose another significant barrier to 
efforts to reduce bribery. Meticulous accounting practices are essential to detecting and 
preventing bribery. Because bribery often involves financial payment in one form or 
another, and it almost inevitably leaves a paper trail (Kimbro, 2002). Accounting is an 
information system that reports financial transactions and auditing serves as a monitoring 
and internal control mechanism: together they form a critical line of defense against 
corrupt practices.
Market Environment
The market environment for Asian firms has changed dramatically in recent 
decades. Many developing countries have introduced market-oriented reforms to open up 
more sectors for competition, and globalization entails competition not only among local 
firms but also with multinational companies that may have better technology and 
products. These changes could have profound impacts on firms’ decisions to participate 
in bribery and other corruption schemes. Market competition created by dismantling state 
monopolies may reduce bribery activities by decreasing firms’ incentive to bribe. 
Increased market competition may also offer firms the chance to sell to new markets and 
thus decreases their reliance on government procurement contracts to meet sales targets. 
These insights are confirmed by some recent studies show that competition reduces the 
level of corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Clark and Xu, 2004).
Legal Environment
The legal system provides a potential safety valve for controlling the spread of 
bribery practices: it imposes risks on both sides, to corrupt officials and to firms that pay 
bribes (Treisman, 2002). However, the legal system itself is a part of government 
structure and thus subject to the same afflictions. For example, in many Asian countries 
the legal system is as corrupt as other government agencies, if not more so. Firms 
operating within a corrupt legal environment may be more prone to bribery, for two 
reasons. Predatory officials have less to fear when backed by a corrupt legal system. And 
firms can bribe their way out of trouble when dealing with law enforcement agencies, 
even if their bribery activities become exposed. 
Regulatory Environment
Regulation is an important policy instrument that governments can wield to 
combat various market failures that are pervasive in modern society, and it has assumed a 
heightened role in many developing countries after market-oriented reforms. However, 
regulation can provide a fertile breeding ground for bribery in countries with weak 
governance, where officials charged with regulatory responsibility are often given 
discretionary power (Wei, 2000). Governments not only impose regulations but also levy 
taxes and enforce criminal laws. As they carry out these functions, officials can delay and 
harass firms that they deal with, and they can impose costs selectively in a way that 
affects firms’ competitive position (Rose-Ackerman, 1996). The greater an official’s 
discretionary power becomes, the more opportunities arise for extracting bribery 
payments. Moreover, according to the endogenous harassment theory, predatory officials 
may create unnecessary regulations and rules expressly in order to maximize 
opportunities for reaping payments. Such opaque and complex regulatory environments 
create various incentives for firms to pay bribes, including quick approval of registration 
permits or licenses, or favorable interpretations of laws and regulations. 
Quality of Government Services
Commonly referred to as facilitating payment, or speed money (Argandona, 
2005), bribes may be paid to avoid delays induced by a government’s failure to deliver 
their services efficiently. In many developing countries, governments are unable to 
deliver standardized quality services because of no competition in the provision of these 
services, or no incentive for government employees to improve services, or both; but 
firms can obtain packaged services in exchange for bribes paid (Gaviria  2002; Rose-
Ackerman  2002). One would expect firms to have a higher propensity to pay bribes in an 
environment where the quality of government services is low. 
Taxation
Tax evasion is a common form of financial fraud among firms that are 
confronted with high taxes (Palda, 2001). Opportunities for tax evasion provide firms 
with an incentive to bribe tax collectors to overlook the fraud. And taxation subjects 
firms to extortion from corrupt officials who have discretionary powers to interpret and 
enforce laws and regulations on taxation, and this is especially true in instances where 
arbitrary and irregular tax-like levies are imposed by authorities (Asher, 2001). One 
would expect that firms facing high taxes would have greater propensity to bribe. 
Empirical Analysis
Data
In contrast to the wealth of literature on corruption, few empirical studies on 
bribery have been conducted on the firm level. The secretive and illicit nature of bribery 
poses serious challenges for data collection. In recent years, however, international 
financial institutions have launched several large-scale cross-country surveys targeted at 
the firm level, such as the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) and the 
Business Enterprise Environment Performance Survey (BEEPS). Because these surveys 
address many issues related to bribery activities, they provide unique new data on firm-
level bribery that can be used for empirical research (Svensson, 2003; Kaufmann, 1997). 
The present study relies on data from the World Business Environment Survey 
(WBES), conducted by the World Bank, to determine the constraints that businesses 
confront worldwide. The surveys were carried out over a period of roughly eighteen 
months between the end of 1998 and the middle of 2000. Data were collected mostly 
through personal interviews conducted at the managerial level, and 10,032 enterprises 
from 83 countries participated in the survey. WBES appears to be the only survey to 
record information on corruption and bribery from individual firms across Asian 
countries (BEEPS contains similar information but for 26 transitions countries in Central 
and East Europe).
WEBS data are particularly suitable for comparative analysis of bribery activities 
in Asia because 1,867 firms from 12 Asian countries participated in the survey (for 
details, see Table 3). The survey contains several important questions directly related to 
corruption and bribery in firms’ business environment. For example, it asks the 
respondent/manager how often the individual firm must make “additional payment” to 
public officials to get things done1, and it elicits the amount of bribes paid as a percentage 
of the firm’s revenues2. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Bribery Practices in Asian Firms
Table 4 presents an overall assessment of bribery practices among Asian firms. 
When similar ratings such as “frequently,” “usually,” and “always” are combined, for 
analytical purposes, under a single heading such as “regularly,” the survey reveals that 
54% of Asian firms regularly pay bribes to public officials. Only 17% of firms have 
never paid any bribe. The results also indicate the highly institutionalized nature of 
bribery in many Asian countries: firms generally learn in advance the amount(s) of 
payment that will be required, and bribe takers do deliver promised services once 
payments are received. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT THERE]
                                                
1 Firms were asked: “How often do firms in my line of business have to pay some irregular ‘additional 
payments’ for government officials to get things done?” The responses were tabulated across a range: always, 
usually, frequently, sometimes, seldom, and never.
2 Firms were asked: “What percentage of revenues do firms like yours pay per annum in unofficial payments 
to public officials?” The responses ranged across percentages: 0%, less than 1%, 1 to 2%, 2 to 10%, 10 to 
12%, 12 to 25%, and > 25%.
Equally informative is the evidence that many firms have the option of not 
paying bribes. More than half of the Asian firms surveyed reported that they could seek 
out other officials to get correct treatment without recourse to bribe payments. Thus it 
becomes clear that the corporate sector is not just a “victim” of corruption, and many 
firms are in fact active and willing parties to corrupt transactions. 
There is considerable variation in the degree, or incidence, of bribery 
experienced in different Asian countries. Table 5 indicates that 98% of firms in 
Bangladesh reported regularly paying bribes to public officials, whereas 90% of firms in 
Singapore never paid any. It is also interesting to note that a country’s rank in the 
Corruption Perception Index roughly corresponds to its incidence of bribery payments, a 
confirmation that the corporate sector is indeed a major contributor to the rampant 
corruption problems in Asia. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
Among firms reporting graft activities, the amount of bribes paid also differs 
considerably from country to country (Table 6). In Azerbaijan, Indonesia, Pakistan, and 
Malaysia, more than a quarter of these firms paid out at least 10% of their sales as bribes. 
And, from country to country, the amount of bribe payment may not be correlated closely 
with the incidence of bribery. For example, the incidence of bribery reported by 
Malaysian firms is quite low, but a significant portion of the Malaysian firms that were 
involved in bribery made sizeable payouts. In Bangladesh, by contrast, although 98% of 
firms reported some degree of bribery activity, the majority of these firms made only 
small payouts. From this perspective, anti-corruption programs may actually result in 
increased amounts per bribe payoff, as a higher reward is needed to justify the increased 
risk of being caught in illicit activity (Rose-Ackerman, 2002).
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
In summary, the corporate sector is an important source of prevalent corruption 
problems in Asia. WBES survey results demonstrate that the majority of Asian firms 
have been involved in bribery activities, although the nature of these activities varies
distinctively across countries. Firms may pay a sizable portion of their sales as bribes, 
and bribe payments often lead to further extortions from predatory officials. 
Econometric Models
Three econometric models—probit, ordered, and interval regression—were 
adopted to test the hypotheses on the determinants of bribery in Asian firms. The probit 
model focuses on firms’ decisions to engage in or refrain from bribery in their business 
operations. The ordered probit model investigates how frequently firms are engaged in 
bribery.  The interval regression model analyzes size of payments among firms that do 
pay bribes. Together, these econometric models offer a multidimensional view of the 
dynamics of bribery activities among Asian firms.
The probit model assumes that the firm’s bribe payment ( *iy ) is a function of a 
set of variables. That is, 
iii uxy  '*  , (1)
where *iy is assumed to be a “latent” variable that cannot be observed directly. What is 










The dependent variable for the probit model is Iij , a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not firm i in country j is involved in bribery activities. Iij takes 1 if the firm 
has engaged in bribery, and Iij equals to 0 if the firm has never been involved in bribery. 









i xFxFL  , (3)
where F is the cumulative distribution function of u. 
From the hypotheses on the determinants of bribery described in the previous 
section, a set of independent variables can be defined to measure firm characteristics; 
corporate governance; market, legal, and regulatory environments; quality of government 
services; and taxation. These, summarized in Table 7, are defined as follows.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
SMALL (H1) and SALES (H2) test the importance of firm characteristics in 
determining the firms’ propensity to engage in bribery. SMALL is a dummy variable 
taking 1 if firm has less than 500 employees and 0 for firm with 500 employees and 
above, and SALES represents the growth rate of firm’s sales over the last three years (can 
be positive, negative or zero). 
Three variables, INDIVFAM (H3), IAS (H4), and AUDIT (H4), measure the 
importance of corporate governance in determining the propensity for bribery. All three 
are dummy variables. INDIVFAM indicates whether a firm is controlled by individual 
owners or family (as distinct from, e.g., a governing board or managers). IAS indicates 
whether a firm has adopted international accounting standards while AUDIT indicates 
whether a firm’s annual financial report receives an external audit. 
Operating environment is represented by three variables: market, legal, and 
regulatory. Number of competitors (COMPETITION) tests the hypotheses on the 
importance of market environment in determining propensity to bribe (H5). Firms’ legal 
environment is measured by COURT (H6), a nominal variable scaling from 1 to 6, 
indicating the extent to which the court system is honest and uncorrupted. Quality of the 
regulatory environment is measured by LICENSING (licensing requirements) and 
INTERPRETATION (level of transparency in interpretation of laws and regulations), 
corresponding to H7 and H8, respectively. 
Two independent variables on governmental influences round out the probit 
model.  GOVEFFIC (H9) measures the impacts of quality of government services on 
bribery in terms of firm’s responses to a question on the efficiency of government in 
delivering services (ranging from “very inefficient” to “very efficient”). TAXATION 
(H10) measures firms’ perceptions on the extent to which high taxes are an obstacle to 
business activity (ranging from “no obstacle” to “major obstacle”). 
The second econometric model, the ordered probit model, focuses on the 
determinants of frequency of bribery activities. The dependent variable, BRIBE, indicates 
how frequently firms engage in bribery (ranging from “never” to “always”). This model 
assumes that frequency of bribery practices ( *iy ) is a function of a set of variables, 
including the test variables and control variable. That is, 
iii uxy  '*  , (4)
where *iy is a “latent” variable that cannot be observed directly. What is observed is 
yi = “never” if 0
* iy
= “seldom” if 1
*0  iy
= “sometimes” if 2
*
1   iy
= “frequently” if 3
*
2   iy
= “mostly” if 4
*
3   iy
= “always” if 5
*
4   iy . (5)
The corresponding probabilities for each ordinal interval can be stated as: 
Prob ( )""neveryi  = )'( ix 
Prob ( )""seldomyi  = )'()'( 1 ii xx  
Prob ( )""sometimesyi  = )'()'( 12 ii xx  
Prob ( )"" frequentlyyi  = )'()'( 23 ii xx  
Prob ( )""mostlyyi  = )'()'( 34 ii xx  
Prob ( )""alwaysyi  = )'()'( 45 ii xx   .   (6)













where ]'[, ijji x  , ]'[ 11, ijji x   and Zij is an indicator variable 
which equals 1 if jyi  and 0 otherwise. 
The interval regression model assumes that a firm’s bribe payment ( *iy ) is a 
function of a set of variables. That is, 
iii uxy  '*  . (8)
Although *iy cannot be directly observed, information is in hand regarding the upper and 
lower bound of payments made by bribe-paying firms; it is thus possible to use the 
interval regression model to estimate the determinants of the amount of bribe payment. 
The dependent variable for the model is taken from responses to a question on amount of 
bribes as a percentage of the firms’ revenues. Only firms responding with non-zero 
percentages are included in the estimation, and six brackets are constructed, 
corresponding to firms reporting less than 1% (0, 0.01), 1% to 2% (0.01, 0.02), 2% 
to10% (0.02, 0.10), 10 to 12% (0.10, 0.20), 12 to 25% (0.12, 0.25), and more than 25% 
(0.25, 1.00). The two numbers in the each bracket indicate the lower ( lowerib ) and upper 
( upperib ) bounds of the bribery payment made by the firm. The likelihood function for the 






















The same independent variables are used for all three models. A set of dummy 
variables for country was also included, to control for country and international 
differences such as global corruption and income level. A set of industry-level dummy 
variables was added to control for the influence of sectors (manufactory, services, 
agriculture) on bribery. 
Regression Results
The results of the three models are presented in Table 8. Column (1) reports the 
coefficients and standard errors of the estimation based on the probit model, which aims 
at explaining firms’ decisions on whether or not to bribe. 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
The results show that firm characteristics matter. Consistent with other empirical 
studies (Clarke and Xu, 2004; Svensson, 2003), the propensity to bribe is significantly 
correlated with firm size. Small Asian firms are more likely to bribe than their larger 
counterparts (H1). However, the hypothesis on relationship between firm growth and 
propensity to bribe (H2) is unsupported. Firms experiencing slower growth are just a 
likely to engage in bribery as the fast-growing firms. 
Corporate governance also may play an important role in propensity to bribe. 
Consistent with the hypothetical prediction, firms controlled by individual owners and 
family are more likely to pay bribes than are firms governed by boards or other advisors
(H3). However, firms’ accounting practices, as measured by adoption of international 
standards and practices (H4), do not show a statistically significant effect on propensity
to bribe. These results suggest that while actual improvement in accounting practices can 
potentially reduce the incidence of bribery, mere lip service to accounting rules and 
regulations will do little to reverse the trend. 
The effect of market competition on bribery (H5) is both statistically and 
economically significant in the probit and ordered probit models, but the sign on the 
coefficients on COMPETITION shows that the level of competition has positive effects 
on bribery activities, in contrary to the theoretical prediction made earlier. One plausible 
explanation is that firms may acquiesce to increased bribe payments if a bidding war for 
desired services intensifies. Another explanation is that, in a fiercely competitive 
environment, firms may resort to bribery to sidestep bureaucratic red tape when delays 
could directly translate to loss of market share. The findings of a positive correlation 
between competition and bribery activities suggest that reform initiatives to increase 
market competition, such as privatization and deregulation, might actually create some 
obstacles for anti-corruption campaign from the supply side of corruption.  
Legal and regulatory environments play a significant role in determining firms’ 
propensity to bribe. Propensity to bribe is found negatively correlated with quality of 
legal environment as measured by the extent to which the court system is viewed as 
honest and uncorrupted (H6). Characteristics of the regulatory environment are also 
among key determinants of propensity to bribe: firms that report resentment over 
licensing requirements (LICENSING) are more likely to bribe government officials (H7), 
and the opposite is true for firms that are satisfied with persistence and predictability of 
interpretation of laws and regulations (H8). 
Both the quality of government service (GOVEFFIC) and level of taxes 
(TAXATION) are shown to be important determinants of firms’ decision to bribe. The 
more efficient the governance service, the less likely firms will engage in bribery (H9). 
Firms are more likely to bribe if they perceive high taxes are barriers to their businesses
(H10). 
Column (2) reports the results of the ordered probit model that focus on the 
determinants of frequency of bribery. These results are quite similar to the estimations 
based on the probit model, an indication that the findings are robust. Small firms have 
higher incidence of bribery than large ones, and firms controlled by individual owners 
and family bribe more often than firms controlled by corporate boards, managers, or 
financial institutions. Here too, operating environments play key roles: level of 
competition drives firms to bribe more frequently, honest and uncorrupt court systems 
reduce firms’ incentives to bribe, and firms bribe more often if facing tortuous licensing 
requirements. And quality of government service and level of taxes also feature among 
determinants of the incidence of bribery. 
The dynamics determining amount of paid by firms that decide to bribe (Column 
3, the interval regression model) do not follow the pattern visible in Columns (1) and (2).  
Firm size (SMALL) and the identity of controlling stakeholders (INDIVFAM) both have 
the expected effects on amount of bribe payment, but the coefficients are not statistically 
significant. However, the growth rate of bribe-paying firms has statistically significant 
effects on the amount of bribes paid: the higher the growth rate, the less is required for 
bribes. This result suggests that high-growth firms may have more leverage in dealing 
with requests from corrupt officials. Other statistically significant variables in this 
column, INTERPRETATION and GOVEFFIC, indicate that the more transparent the 
interpretation of laws and regulation is perceived to be, and the more efficient 
government services are perceived to be, the less amount firms will pay in bribes. 
Discussion
In summary, the multivariate analysis suggests that bribery activities at the firm 
level are determined by a set of determinants both internal and external to the firms. Firm 
size, identity of controlling stakeholders, integrity of court systems, licensing 
requirements, transparency of interpretation of laws and regulations, efficiency of 
government services, and level of taxes are all shown to be important factors in firms’ 
propensity to bribe and in incidence of bribery. But quite a different picture emerges 
regarding the dynamics driving the amount of bribes paid: only a small set of variables 
prove to be significantly correlated here.
While most of these findings are consistent with theoretical predictions and other 
empirical work, a few “surprises” have emerged.  Market competition may drive up the 
level bribery activities, and contrary to the “ability to pay” hypothesis, high-growth firms 
would pay a relatively lower proportion of revenue in bribes than would firms with 
slower growth.  In addition, intriguingly, the results consistently show that conformity 
with international accounting standards and practices may not directly contribute to the 
reduction of bribery at the firm level. 
Concluding Remarks
Although most Asian firms consider corruption among the major obstacles for 
business development, a substantial percentage of these firms are engaged in bribery 
activities in regular basis. The empirical analysis presented here clearly shows that the 
corporate sector, often portrayed as the victim of corruption, is an important source of 
rampant corruption problems in Asia. In most countries a majority of firms have engaged 
in bribery activities, and in some countries almost all firms are involved in one way or 
another. These bribery practices are highly institutionalized, as there appears to be little 
uncertainty regarding the amount of bribes expected to be paid as well as the delivery of 
services in exchange for bribe payments. It is also clear that corporate bribe-payers are 
not always the innocent prey that they are made out to be, for many firms are active and 
willing parties in corrupt transactions.
Perhaps because the corporate role in bribery activities in Asia has not been well 
understood, the potential for containing corruption through the reduction of such 
practices in the corporate sector has not been fully explored. One major shortcoming of 
many anti-corruption programs is that the supply side of corruption problems has not 
been given due attention. Corruption has aspects of both demand and supply, and the 
actions of bribe-payers (supply side) are as important as those of bribe-takers (demand 
side) in determining the nature and level of corruption. 
The empirical analysis detailed above points to several potential areas where 
anti-corruption programs can work more effectively by targeting the supply side of 
corruption problems.  Corporate decisions to engage in bribery are determined by factors 
both internal and external to firms. Characteristics such as firm size and growth rate are 
important determinants of bribery activities at the firm level, and corporate governance 
can also play an important role in determining the propensity and incidence of bribery. 
External influences that firms must confront may render them more vulnerable to bribery 
practices. Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, 
corrupted court systems, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation 
of laws and regulations, inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes. 
The findings shown here suggest that government, the business community, and 
individual firms all have respective roles to play in combating bribery in Asian firms. 
Government can significantly reduce bribery by targeting areas where firms are most 
prone to bribery practices, such as integrity of court systems, business licensing 
requirements, quality of government service delivery, and taxation. The business 
community can reduce incidence of bribery by setting up rules of market competition so 
that bribery will not automatically increase as the level of competition rises. Individual 
firms can shoulder their share of responsibility through improvements in corporate 
governance, such as broadening the basis of ownership. 
Success in combating bribery in Asian firms will have significant impacts in 
several arenas. It is not only of paramount importance to sustaining growth in Asian 
countries but also essential to the global anti-corruption campaign, because many Asian 
countries are among the leading exporting nations in the world. If Asian firms cannot 
develop effective measures against bribery activities within and among themselves, such 
practices may spread and contribute to the increase of corruption in other countries. 
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Rank Raw score Rank Raw score Rank
Singapore 9.3* 3 9.1 6 9.4 5
Hong Kong 7.1 11 7.7 15 8.3 12
Japan 6.7 20 6.4 23 7.3 21
Malaysia 5.3 23 4.8 36 5.1 39
South Korea 4.3 4.0 48 5.0 40
Thailand 2.8 34 3.2 60 3.8 59
China 2.2 40 3.1 63 3.2 78
Sri Lanka - - - - 3.2 78
Mongolia - - - - 3.0 85
India 2.8 35 2.8 69 2.9 88
Kazakhstan - - - - 2.6 107
Vietnam - - 2.5 76 2.6 107
Nepal - - - - 2.5 117
Philippines 2.8 36 2.8 69 2.5 117
Azerbaijan - 1.5 87 2.2 137
Indonesia 1.9 41 1.7 85 2.2 137
Pakistan 2.3 39 - - 2.1 144
Myanmar - - - - 1.8 155
Bangladesh - - - - 1.7 158
Data Source: Transparency International
*The raw scores are measured in a scale of 1-10 scale (10 being very “clean” and 1 being 
very corrupted). 
**The date is not available as the country was not ranked in that particular year. 
Table 2. A summary of Hypotheses on the Determinants of Bribery
Hypothesis
Firm Characteristics
Firm Size and Growth Rate H1: Small firms are more likely to pay bribe than large 
firms
H2: Firms with higher growth rate are more likely to 
pay bribes
Corporate Governance H3: Family-run firms will be more likely to pay bribes 
than firms under other forms of governance structure
H4: Firms with poor accounting practices are more 
likely to be engaged in bribery activities than firms with 
good accounting practices
Operating Environment
Market Environment H5: The more competitive the firms’ market 
environment, the less likely the firms will pay bribes 
Legal Environment H6: Firms are more likely to pay bribes if the legal 
system is corrupted. 
Regulatory Environment H7: Firms will be more likely to pay bribe if they 
perceive the regulation on licensing is problematic. 
H8: Firms will be more likely to pay bribe if they 
perceive the interpretation of laws of regulations are not 
transparent. 
Government Influence
Quality of Government Service H9: Firms are more likely to pay bribe in an 
environment where the quality of government services 
is low. 
Taxation H10: Firms are more likely to pay bribes if they face 
high taxes
Table 3. Coverage of WBES in Asia














Table 4. Nature of Bribery in Asian Firms
Never Seldom Sometimes Regularly*
Do firms have to pay some irregular 
"additional payments" to government 
officials to get things done? 17% 10% 19% 54%
Do firms know in advance about how 
much this "additional payment" is? 9% 12% 22% 57%
Is the service delivered as agreed if the 
firm pays the required "additional 
payment"? 5% 5% 13% 77%
Would another government official
subsequently require an additional 
payment for the same service if firm pays 
the required additional payment to a 
particular government official? 20% 11% 21% 47%
Can the firms go to another official to get 
the correct treatment without recourse to 
unofficial payments if a government agent 
acts against the rules? 25% 22% 24% 29%
Data source: WBES (2000) and author’s calculation.
* Similar ratings such as “frequently,” “usually,” and “always” are grouped into one 
category (“regularly”)
Table 5. Incidence of Bribery vs. Perception of Corruption among Firms across Asian 
Countries
Incidence Of Bribery Perception of Corruption









Azerbaijan 17% 14% 9% 59% 21% 22% 17% 40%
Bangladesh 0% 2% 4% 94% 4% 4% 29% 63%
Cambodia 15% 14% 27% 44% N/A N/A N/A N/A
India 11% 6% 28% 55% 6% 33% 35% 26%
Indonesia 6% 3% 23% 68% 15% 36% 20% 29%
Kazakhstan 28% 13% 35% 24% 34% 14% 20% 32%
Malaysia 45% 7% 27% 20% 47% 31% 14% 9%
Pakistan 4% 9% 17% 70% 5% 12% 32% 51%
Philippines 13% 17% 27% 43% 10% 17% 25% 48%
Singapore 90% 7% 1% 2% 85% 7% 6% 2%
Thailand 4% 8% 10% 79% 1% 12% 26% 61%
Total 17% 10% 19% 54% 24% 21% 22% 32%
Data source: WBES (2000) and author’s calculation.
N/A: Information Not Available
Table 6. Amount of Bribery among firms across Asian Countries
Amount of bribery payments





Azerbaijan 56% 10% 26% 7%
Bangladesh 65% 16% 19% 0%
Cambodia 39% 39% 18% 5%
Indonesia 49% 24% 23% 4%
Kazakhstan 62% 18% 17% 3%
Malaysia 42% 32% 26% 0%
Pakistan 41% 27% 29% 3%
Philippines 73% 15% 13% 0%
Thailand 49% 28% 21% 2%
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev.
SMALL Dummy variable. 1=Small size firm; 0=all others 0.82 0.38
INDIVFAM Dummy variable. 1=firm is controlled either by 
individual owner(s) or a family; 0=all others
0.49 0.50
IAS Dummy variable. 1=firm adopts international 
accounting standards; 0=all others
0.48 0.50
AUDIT Dummy variable. 1=Annual financial statements 
reviewed by external auditor; 0=all others
0.58 0.49
COMPETITION Number of competitors 2.50 0.83
SALES Percentage of change (increase or decrease) of the 
firm’s sales over the last three years
0.03 0.36
COURT The extent to which the court system is 
honest/uncorrupt (1=never; 2=seldom; 
3=sometimes; 4=frequent; 5=usually; 6=always)
3.56 1.56
GOVEFFIC Efficiency of government in delivering services 
(1=very efficient; 2=inefficient; 3=mostly 
inefficient; 4=mostly efficient; 5=efficient; 6=very 
efficient) 3.60 1.27
LICENSING The extent to which business licensing is 
problematic. Scale from 1 to 4 (1=no obstacle; 
2=minor obstacle; 3=moderate obstacle; 4=major 
obstacle) 1.98 0.99
TAXATION The extent to which tax regulations/administration 
are problematic. Scale from 1 to 4 (1=no obstacle; 
2=minor obstacle; 3=moderate obstacle; 4=major 
obstacle) 2.97 1.06
INTERPRETATION The extent to which interpretations of regulations 
affecting the firm are consistent and predictable 
(1=never; 2=seldom; 3=sometimes; 4=frequently; 
5=mostly; 6=always)
3.86 1.19
Table 8. Regression Results
(1) (2) (3)
SMALL 0.380** 0.150* 0.005
(0.168) (0.092) (0.008)
INDIVFAM 0.307** 0.160** 0.006
(0.143) (0.079) (0.005)
IAS 0.169 0.018 0.001
(0.146) (0.087) (0.006)
AUDIT -0.023 0.014 -0.009
(0.206) (0.112) (0.007)
COMPETITION 0.727*** 0.173** 0.002
(0.101) (0.074) (0.006)
SALES -0.042 -0.049 -0.013**
(0.131) (0.074) (0.005)
COURT -0.123** -0.078*** -0.006***
(0.050) (0.029) (0.002)
LICENSING 0.207** 0.107*** 0.004
(0.083) (0.041) (0.003)
INTERPRETATION -0.193*** -0.045 -0.007***
(0.067) (0.036) (0.002)
GOVEFFIC -0.246*** -0.248*** -0.005**
(0.063) (0.037) 0.002
TAXATION 0.249*** 0.200*** 0.002
(0.064) (0.043) 0.003
Number of Observations 899 901 454
Pseudo R2 0.381 0.100
Note: The table reports unstandardized coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
